Working Paper n.º 12
Towards Emancipation of the Self: A Critique of ‘Security as Emancipation’
01 | 10 | 2005
João Reis Nunes, University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Summary
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the ‘security as emancipation’ literature, by examining and problematizing its conception of the individual as subject and object of emancipation. The unquestioned assumptions and the pre-given answers, concerning the individual, that permeate the Critical Security Studies literature can be considered an important theoretical gap, which ultimately leads to an incapacity to conceptualize the conditions under which emancipation is to be undertaken. It will be argued that the absence of an analysis of the individual in this body of literature (and particularly in the work of Ken Booth) paves the way for the emergence of liberal, competitive and self-interested conceptions, which ultimately undermine the idea of emancipation by surrendering it to the ‘marketplace of emancipation claims’. The next step will be to problematize these taken-for-granted notions, by presenting a different philosophical position towards the individual, as embedded in modern societies. The objective is to create the space for critique and dissent, whilst making the case for a reconstruction of emancipatory capacity and possibilities around the idea of ‘emancipation of the self’. By identifying the individual as a threat to security, a field of struggle and a site for emancipation, this paper will argue for the broadening and deepening of the ‘security as emancipation’ discourse.
‘Security as Emancipation’
‘Security’ and ‘emancipation’ are two unlikely partners, drawn together by the Welsh School of Critical Security Studies (CSS) in a critique of ‘traditional’ understandings and practices of security.
In fact, emancipation is related to the ‘critical’ as security to the ‘traditional’. While securitas evokes stability, surety, guaranty, emancipatio describes a situation in which something is disrupted[i]. To be secure means to be free from care, to be unconcerned and in composure; to emancipate is to problematize and deny the rigidity of a given situation. To secure means to conserve, to possess and control; to emancipate means to set free, to release.
Thus, if securitas is a state[ii], emancipatio is a process. The equation of security as emancipation recognizes that security is not a specific end-point to be achieved (an olympic realm of absence of threats), but rather a process of reform and transformation of what is prevalent, and even of what is sometimes deemed as ‘secure’.
Emancipatio is to be a critique of securitas. Ken Booth, one of the leading figures of CSS, sees ‘security as emancipation’ as an alternative to formulations of security deemed as ethno-centric, statist, militaristic, masculinistic, positivist and realist, whose claims to neutrality and objectivity disguise complicity with the status quo. In Booth’s words:
‘human society urgently needs a Security Studies which goes beyond problem-solving within the status quo, and instead seeks to help engage with the problem of the status quo’ (‘Critical Explorations’, forthcoming, emphasis in the original).
Traditional formulations of security, whilst espousing an orderly ‘state of unconcern’, actually conceal multiple threats. The emancipatory stance aims at drawing attention to the structures and practices of insecurity (both the blatant and the insidious), located beyond and beneath ‘traditional’ inter-state military violence.
Booth defines emancipation as
‘the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do’ (1991a:319)[iii].
In this definition, no mention is made to the state (the traditional referent object) or to war (the traditional threat). In fact, the state is no longer ‘that which is to be rendered secure’ and becomes, to large extent, one of the most important threats to the individual, the new referent object of security.
However, does this call for a shift from the state to the individual inaugurate an ‘era of the individual’ in Security Studies? Not quite. If CSS has succeeded in problematizing traditional conceptions of security, the discourse of ‘security as emancipation’ has, so far, remained largely unproblematized by its proponents. This paper, which shares the CSS normative commitment to emancipation, will argue that Booth actually fails to address the individual.
In Booth’s definition, one obvious and fundamental question is bypassed: what kind of individual are we talking about? Individual and ‘constraints’ appear as two unproblematized poles in a dichotomous relationship. Booth seems to regard the individual as someone who would choose and decide freely about her/his life, were it not for certain physical and human constraints: ‘war and the threat of war’, ‘poverty’, ‘poor education’, ‘political oppression’, ‘economic collapse’, ‘scarcity’, ‘overpopulation’, ‘ethnic rivalry’, ‘the destruction of nature’, ‘terrorism’, ‘crime’ and ‘disease’ (1991a:318, 319) are some of the threats that Booth identifies.
However broad and encompassing Booth’s accounts of the constraints facing the individual might be, they remain ultimately unsatisfactory because Booth has failed to provide an account of the individual that must face up with these constraints. Rather, in his work, the individual is taken for granted and, therefore, assumes an ahistorical character.
The under-theorization of the individual as referent of emancipation is an important theoretical gap. The objective of this paper is to problematize this ontological securitas of the individual, i.e. this belief in the existence of a normal, natural, individual reality that is recipient and victim of constraints.
‘Human wrongs’ and individual are not two separate entities. Physical and human constraints are not merely the direct result of exclusionary practices or particular social and economic arrangements imposed upon the individual; rather, they cannot be understood without taking into account forms of domination within the individual. I will argue that the current state of the individual is a human wrong that needs to be addressed by emancipatory theory and practice.
My objective is to make a contribution to the ‘security as emancipation’ literature, by arguing for a new understanding of the individual and, consequently, a broader and deeper conception of emancipation[iv]. Against the idea of the individual as a secure state, the intention is to raise the awareness towards the ‘emancipation of the self’.
chapter one
The Individual in ‘Security as Emancipation’
This chapter will provide an interpretation of the individual in the ‘security as emancipation’ discourse. I chose to rely on the work of Ken Booth because, besides having a status of ‘pioneer’ in the field, it provides the most explicit and detailed treatment of the subject. Although it would be bold to equate Booth’s views with those of the CSS School, I believe that Booth can be considered the best representative of the ‘security as emancipation’ discourse.
My contention will be that Booth’s formulation of security, explicitly embedded in Enlightenment ideals (I), paves the way for a liberalist conception of the individual (II). My next step will be to argue that the liberal individual actually betrays the emancipation project (III). Finally, I will draw on Marx to introduce a new conception of the individual (IV and V), to be developed in the next chapter.
I – Booth and the Enlightenment
Even though his position towards the Enlightenment is not that of an uncritical adherent[v], Booth makes no attempt to hide the heritage of Enlightenment ideals in his work. He grounds his cosmopolitan ideas in ‘the Enlightenment commitment to universal reason [and] the universalist ideas of liberté, egalité and fraternité released by the French Revolution’ (1999:61).
Booth shares with Enlightenment thinkers the faith in the triumph of reason. In his work, emancipation and reason run side by side:
‘Over time, emancipation has become deeply imprinted into human consciousness. The biological instinct for survival evolved over time into a culture of reason, which in turn became the politics of emancipation’ (1999:43).
The Enlightenment belief in the triumph of reason was inherently emancipatory, for it sought to free the individual from all external, corporate and spiritual constraints. Booth follows David Hume in defining the importance of reason as a way to emancipate humanity from ‘ignorance, traditional social relations, superstition and the rest’ (1995:109). Reason is a proactive force in human life: it is aimed at reorganizing the political, moral and economic realms in order to serve individual interests (Kramnick 1995). Reason is the first stage of emancipation because it allows for an awareness of human nature, buried beneath exogenous constraints.
Reason is connected to progress in human consciousness and praxis: in Booth’s affirmation that ‘Hiroshima and Auschwitz showed the terrible convergence of Enlightenment science and pre-Enlightenment solipsist massacre’ (1998a:32) we can find traces of D’Alembert’s idea of ‘the human mind emerged from barbarism’ (1995 [1760]).
Booth argues against the reification of the existent, what he terms ‘the tyranny of the present tense’ (1999:34). If, as he states, ‘change is the only constant’ (1999:35), to emancipate is, necessarily, to steer movement into a desired, progressive direction:
‘By ‘progressive’ I mean simply a belief in the importance of having ideals in society, and trying to shape law, politics and institutions accordingly. The idea of progress derives from the laudable refusal of some people to believe that this is the best of all possible worlds’ (Booth, ‘Beyond CSS’, forthcoming).
The ideal of emancipation comes up as a philosophical anchorage that determines what it means to choose the ‘right side’, i.e. the side of human progress, ‘human flourishing’ away from oppression (Booth 1999:43, 41). Emancipation, progress and reason are intertwined in a system of mutual validation.
Connected with the belief in progress is a disenchanted view of the past. Booth’s insurgence against the horrors of the Westphalian system is an echo of Voltaire’s words:
‘all history, then, in short, is little else than a long succession of useless cruelties... a collection of crimes, follies and misfortunes, among which we have now and then met with a few virtues, and some happy times; as we sometimes see a few scattered huts in a barren desert’ (1995 [1754]:371).
These few huts in the desert provide, however, for a rational hope in progress. Booth’s hope is based on Kant’s ‘practical impracticalities’ and the idea that ‘what is politically possible can indeed expand’ (1991a:325).
Moreover, hope is connected with a confidence in human agency, and grounded in reason and empirical evidence: Booth argues that a global morality is emerging in a world of transnational NGO’s and progressive social movements, a world of human rights concerns, of humanitarian solidarity, of... critical theorists.
Another important Enlightenment-inspired feature in Booth’s thought is the emphasis on the pursuit of happiness and self-realization. In 1682, Bayle expressed ‘our natural inclination to seek pleasure’ (1995 [1682]:77). The maximisation of public happiness was one of the justifications for the utilitarian politics of Bentham, and for Hume’s philosophical enquiry into human nature. The freedom of the individual from ancestral bonds is connected with the belief that one is master of its own destiny, as well as with the idea that the rational decision of the unconstrained individual necessarily leads to happiness.
CSS follows these assumptions perhaps too closely, and so the focus on ethics and human choices leaves a lot unquestioned: all the answers regarding human intentions and needs are pre-given and left unproblematized. The objective of ‘security as emancipation’ is to provide conditions for human choice:
‘security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in peoples’ lives... [it] is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming’ (Booth, ‘Introduction’, forthcoming).
There are striking resemblances between Booth’s instrumental view of security as the ‘creating [of] space for the self-realization of individuals’ (1999:43) and the role of politics and the state in liberalist theory. Similarly to the liberal principle of liberty, espoused by Locke and Mill, which rested on an a priori assumption of freedom, ‘security as emancipation’ aims at providing a standard of protection, so that people can develop their own choices towards happiness.
II – Booth and the liberal individual
This focus on the pursuit of happiness and self-realization is linked to the emergence of the world of individualism and self-interest. The call for ‘Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness’ (from the ‘Declaration of Independence of the Thirteen Colonies’, 1776) is tributary to the view of the sacredness of individual reason and choice[vi]. The first objective of the liberal theory of politics must be to set the individual free from political, economic and intellectual shackles. The state is the result of a rational act of consent, personified in a social contract, and aims at the public protection of natural rights.
In his denaturalization of the Westphalian state system, Booth reminds us of this rational act of consent. His views on globalization lead him to the conclusion that the state is no longer the most effective political unit to respond to the increasing number and complexity of demands and threats. Underlying here is the idea that there are natural rights that must be safeguarded by some other kind of political arrangement, other than the state[vii]. As Jefferson in his famous Declaration, Booth seems to regard these ‘unalienable Rights’ as ‘self-evident’ truths.
Therefore, the liberal rationale is present in Booth’s work, although adapted to a complex, networked, globalized world: the individual is endowed with natural rights (such as liberty) and qualities (such as reason). The main goal of politics (or security) is to provide free rein to the fulfilment of potentialities that outgrow naturally from these qualities.
The problem, however, is not the belief in natural rights or qualities, but rather the way with which these are considered to face the constraints of the world. The point where Booth’s work resembles more the liberalist reasoning is, at the same time, the most problematic: the unchanging essence of the individual vis-à-vis the constraints.
The liberal view of ‘individual versus constraints’ can be summarized as follows: on a first moment, the embodiment of reason by the individual allows her/him to surpass ignorance and superstition, and deal objectively with self-evident truths about her/his internal condition and life in general. The second step is the disembodiment of constraints: reason is seen as all-powerful, liberty and self-realization as unquestionable; the natural corollary is the belief that the individual, in itself, constitutes no threat at all. The third step of this process is, therefore, the externalization of constraints, by which all threats are relegated to an exogenous realm.
This process is evident in the conception of liberty as autonomy (self-rule), present in Rousseau, Kant and Mill: the individual’s actions are her/his own, for they are the result of a reasoning entity that critically reflects on ideals and always takes into account true interests. The individual is sovereign in matters concerning her/his own self. The ‘good life’ is a freely chosen one, the result of the natural development of pre-given individual interests and capacities.
Booth distances himself significantly from liberalism in what comes to the economic sphere. Contrary to liberal theory, he believes that economic activity should serve moral ends and global justice. For Booth, emancipation requires an ‘egalitarian concept of liberty’: both equality and liberty are conditions for human emancipation (1999:46), so that ‘liberty without economic status is propaganda’ (1991a:322). Emancipation is equated with this ‘liberty-plus’, the plus being economic conditions to exercise it, as well as the absence of structures that promote and perpetuate inequality. Equality and liberty are intertwined in what constitutes (or should constitute) a natural state of the individual. Therefore, economic status (as equality) means absence of constraints.
However, the exogenous economic constraints do not affect the individual’s internal capacities for rational choice and exercise of liberty – taken-for-granted properties that remain unaltered throughout the process. Therefore, even though he explicitly denies it[viii], Booth’s faithful adherence to the Enlightenment unwittingly paves the way for the emergence of the ‘economic’, self-interested, competitive individual.
III – Problems for emancipation
The sacredness of the individual in pursuit of self-realization opens up the way for the instrumentalization of emancipation for all purposes imaginable, in what could be called a ‘marketplace of emancipation claims’[ix]. The ‘security as emancipation’ discourse espouses an ‘invisible-hand type’ faith in the harmony of emancipation claims. By removing constraints and allowing for a universal ‘liberty with economic status’, global ‘good life’ will necessarily follow. What about when emancipation claims are contradictory? What about when the ‘object’ of emancipation refuses to be so? The emancipation of one can be another one’s oppression.
Contemporary security problems are arenas in which conflicting versions of emancipation are put forward. Emancipation can be invoked by any kind of interests and groups, and the problem is that, most of the times, it is not just about powerful elites manipulating emancipation to suit their interests[x]. Groups of Arabic women refusing to use the veil and groups of Arabic women embracing the veil (whilst refusing Western interference in cultural practices) can, at the same time, invoke the idea of emancipation. And do they all have the right to do so? So far, CSS has not provided answers. Booth’s call to ‘ask the victims’ (1999:56) whenever in doubt is tautological. In a great number of cases, it can be misleading to label individuals or groups as ‘victims’ or ‘oppressors’, in a hierarchic dichotomy that is the precursor of all fundamentalisms.
Booth seems to perceive this compulsion of the marketplace when he argues for ‘authenticity [as] the expression of a prevailing balance of forces’ (1999:37), However, this Gramscian approach towards the possibility of ‘counter hegemonies’ does not avoid the tautological trap of essentialized victimhood[xi], or the fact that the individual is still uncritically endowed with reason, freedom and conscious choice.
Emancipation must begin with a completely different position towards the individual. Let me introduce it, with a brief look at Marx’s concept of ‘human emancipation’.
IV – Marx contra Booth
In the essay ‘On the Jewish Question’, Marx sketches out his conception of ‘human emancipation’, as opposed to the liberal ‘political emancipation’. Marx’s critique of the insufficiencies and pernicious character of political emancipation is connected with his attacks on bourgeois rights:
‘the so called rights of man, as distinct from the rights of the citizen, are quite simply the rights of the member of civil society, i.e. of egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community.’ (Marx 1992 [1844]:229, emphasis in the original)
For Marx, the right to freedom means the rise of the egoistic ‘apolitical man’, as well as the ‘separation of man from men’. Political emancipation is seen as a reduction of the individual. Although waving a veil of freedom and tolerance, it allows for the persistence of the most important forms of unfreedom (in the particular case of Marx’s essay, Judaism[xii]).
Against political emancipation, which resulted in the mere ‘emancipation of the economic processes’, Marx argues for ‘human emancipation’, the restoration of the human world, freedom and relationships (Schroyer 1973:80, 81). The individual must assume citizenship and become a ‘species being’. Real emancipation can only be brought about via the recognition and organization of the ‘forces propres’ (own powers) of the individual as social powers, in the ‘consciously planned social production, work and practice of consciously unified subjects’ (Schmied-Kowarzik 1985, emphasis added). Human practice must lead to progress in consciousness, as opposed to the unconscious human practice of self-interested individuals. Also, human emancipation demands both insight of and struggle against opposing forces.
What are the implications of this? For Marx, the problem is not merely the presence or absence of certain political rights (such as freedom of worship), but rather a particular situation of the individual. It is important to quote at length:
‘Political [liberal] democracy is Christian inasmuch as it regards man... as a sovereign and supreme being; but man in his uncultivated, unsocial aspect, man in his contingent existence, man just as he is, man as he has been corrupted, lost to himself, sold, and exposed to the rule of inhuman conditions and elements by the entire organization of our society...’ (Marx 1992 [1844]:225-6, emphasis in the original).
I cannot overemphasise the importance and depth of this critique: Marx calls for awareness towards the conditions under which the individual is to be found. These are not essentialized dogmas of human nature, but rather contingent situations, the result of particular social and economic arrangements. Instead of assuming an individual endowed with certain universal and self-evident characteristics, Marx introduces the analysis of the impact of structures in the psyche and social character of the modern individual, so that the threats are no longer mere exogenous constraints – the subject itself can be considered a threat.
Even if hinting at an affiliation with ‘human emancipation’, Booth does not follow the core of the Marxian critique. For Marx, human emancipation is needed because, in the current state of affairs, there is no such thing as individual sovereignty. The individual is alienated from her/himself and from her/his social forces, and is unable to perceive the real conditions of existence. Human emancipation can only come about, not only ‘via the revolutionisation of alienated social conditions’ (Marx’s famous point, as stated in Schmied-Kowarzik 1985), but also via significant changes at the level of the alienated individual.
V – Self-deceptions
Booth’s work departs from what he terms a ‘global self-deception’ (1995:108): he argues that ‘critical explorations of the realities of security have to start in our heads before they can take place out in the world’ (‘Critical Explorations’, forthcoming). At first glance, this seems to contradict my argument so far, i.e. that Booth does not take into account the malaise within the individual.
A closer look at Booth’s reasoning, however, shows us that ‘self-deception’ appears, not in the context of the individual mind and behaviour, but in the particular context of the academic and intellectual circles of security theorists. This is a very important thrust in Booth’s work, of which the article ‘Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist’ (1997) is a good example. Even though the title might suggest that Booth is undertaking an analysis of security at the level of the self, the sub-title clears all doubts (or hopes): the aim is to criticize, not only political realism, but also the positivist framework of traditional security studies, based on a rigid distinction between subject and object.
This is, undoubtedly, an important theoretical development, and my own analysis is indebted to the introduction of Critical Theory in Security Studies. Nonetheless, my preoccupations go in a different direction: the aim is not to problematize the security specialist, but rather the individual as subject and object of emancipation.
In a more recent article, again Booth seems to place one foot in the way towards a deep understanding of emancipation: his accounts of the rise of fanaticism in Japan and Yugoslavia hint at problems within the individual that have an effect in external realities, and not just the other way round. However, Booth’s remark that ‘the stoking of historic and not so historic wrongs can turn insecure people into violent thugs’ (‘Two Terrors, One Problem’, forthcoming, emphasis added) is definitely not enough.
Chapter Two
Back to (Frankfurt) School: Reassessing the Individual
According to Walker, rethinking security must address the question of ‘whose security is being assumed and under what conditions’ (1997:69, emphasis added). We have seen that, with Booth, the individual becomes the referent object of security. However, we have also seen that Booth fails to take into account the conditions under which the individual is to be found. This leads to an incapacity to address the conditions under which emancipation of the individual is to be undertaken.
It is important, therefore, to problematize the subject of emancipation, in order to better conceptualize and develop practices of emancipation. Following Walker:
‘it is necessary to ask, first and foremost, how the modern subject is being reconstituted and then to ask what security could possibly mean in relation to it’ (1997:78).
This leads us back to the beginning of this paper: emancipation is a dynamic process that is opposed to security as a stable state. ‘Security as emancipation’ must not, therefore, be dependent of this ahistorical securitas of the individual. Emancipatory change can only be brought about with a problematization of the individual – precisely because the individual is part of the problem.
Sharing with Walker ‘a considerable degree of scepticism toward the modern principles of autonomy and sovereign subjectivity’ (1997:69), I will introduce this problematization by arguing for the importance of an analysis of the individual in the study of social processes (I). The critique of reason (II) and the examination of ideological processes in modern societies (III) will be the footholds for my diagnosis of the individual as alienated (IV). I will reflect on the implications this has for freedom and rational choice (V), as well as in the encroachment of an ontological insecurity of the self (VI).
My intention is not to provide a description of the individual (as a ‘reality out there’) that should be preferred over the liberal one. Rather, the point of this problematization is to open up possibilities for the development of normative decisions and emancipatory action. That is why one has to read this diagnosis of the subject in connection with what will be developed in the next chapter.
I – Individual and depth
The Frankfurt School authors Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno have brought together the Marxist and the Freudian traditions in what could be called a social-psychological critique of society.
Fromm, in particular, addressed the role of psychological factors in the social process. In his work, the relation between the two becomes that of mutual constitution. He defined the ‘social character’ as
‘the essential nucleus of the character structure of most members of a group, which has developed as the result of the basic experiences and mode of life common to that group’ (1942:239).
For Fromm, the character structure is moulded by the social process. Thinking, feeling and acting are not merely the result of biological drives, but rather a cultural product, so that the human character is the result of a ‘dynamic adaptation’ (1942:12) to its conditions of existence[xiii]. The character structure becomes, itself, an important factor in shaping social processes.
This is the theoretical basis for Fromm’s critique of the capitalist system. According to him, the economic development of capitalism brought about significant changes in the psychological sphere: the spirit of restlessness, the compulsion to work, the view of efficiency as a virtue, the desire for wealth and material success.
In turn, these traits became important productive forces in society, so that the consequences of capitalist domination became its causes. Fromm’s analysis draws our attention towards the ‘internal factors blocking the full realization of the freedom of personality’ (1942:91).
Similarly, for Marcuse, the history of civilization, characterized by the inter-relation of domination ‘within’ and ‘without’, cannot be separated from the history of the individual. ‘[The] autonomous personality is the frozen manifestation of the general repression of mankind’ (Marcuse 1969:57).
Before entering into a more detailed analysis, let us retain that any account of emancipatory capacities and potential must take into consideration the fact that psychological factors are intertwined with social and economic forces. A deep understanding of the individual (i.e. one that does not take her/him for granted and enquires into the historical development of the character structure) is the prerequisite for a deep understanding of the political processes relevant to emancipation projects.
II – The critique of reason
For Immanuel Kant, the use of reason was a resolute decision out of human ‘self-incurred tutelage’, a step away from ‘laziness and cowardice’ (1995 [1784]:1). Reason was simultaneously a process of assurance and a state of security.
For the Frankfurt School authors, reason is the ultimate manifestation of a fundamental insecurity of the self. For Adorno and Horkheimer, ‘Enlightenment is mythic fear turn radical’ (1973:16): the conceptualization of reason aimed at total knowledge and total control is the result of the loss of external references (the traditional figures of authority) and the horror of ‘outsideness’. Nature becomes that which is to be comprehended and controlled mathematically, and everything is looked upon by means of formulas, which encapsulate the frightening reality in an orderly, hygienic way.
The process of domination of nature turns against the subject: reason is no longer liberating, but becomes an instrument of repression because of the way the ‘other of reason’ is objectified. According to Marcuse, the ego in Western civilisation is constituted as ‘a subject against an object’ (1969:110): action is domination and reality is resistance.
As the human subject is reduced to a tool of organization and control of the object world (be it nature or other human beings), ‘domination becomes internalized for domination’s sake’ (Horkheimer 1947:93); it becomes the raison d’être of rationality as the assurance of the individual against an external reality deemed as threatening.
However, as Adorno and Horkheimer have noted, this process of self-assertion is inherently one of ‘self-denial’ and ‘introversion of sacrifice’ (1973:68, 55). The struggle with external nature leads to a progressive estrangement from the self, so that the pursuit of selfhood leads, paradoxically, to renunciation of humanity. As mathematical procedures become rituals of thinking, the triumph of reason-as-control becomes an ‘axiomatic self-restriction’ of the individual (Adorno and Horkheimer 1973:25).
Reason becomes domination of the self because the reduction of thought to a mathematical apparatus turns it into a mere instrument. Instrumental reason formalizes rational procedures in terms of means and ends, so that no particular reality is reasonable per se. Horkheimer identified instrumentality with the decline of objective reason, which functions as a tool for the ‘determination of the guiding principles of our lives’ (Horkheimer 1947:11), thereby constituting an agency of ethical insight. Thus, instrumental reason is implicated in the erosion of normative guidelines.
Marcuse analyses the rise of instrumental rationality in terms of ‘one-dimensionality’ (1964:12) or self-validation: everything that transcends the given universe of thought is either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe. With one-dimensionality, the reasoning apparatus is in a constant struggle to justify its own existence, to replicate and reproduce itself.
The origins of one-dimensionality are to be found in Aristotle’s formal logic: by constructing a procedure of thought aiming at universal validity, Aristotle attempted to achieve abstraction and neutrality with respect to material content. The laws of logic were basic tools in the scientific organization of reason.
Plato’s dialectics, on the other hand, was based on a ‘two-dimensional universe of discourse’ (Marcuse 1964:130), because it embraced the reality of the divided world – thought was an interplay of contradictions and potentialities, of essences and appearances, of ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’.
Thus, with one-dimensionality, reason is ‘purged of the negative’ (Marcuse 1964:139) and loses its power of criticizing and falsifying the established reality[xiv]. Reason becomes merely ‘problem-solving’ and coordination of action, in a closed circle of replication of the status quo.
This critique has important consequences: contrarily to liberal conceptions, reason is not a secure state achieved with the defeat of ignorance and barbarism, but rather a process of constitution of the individual, and one that is based on insecurity, self-restriction and domination. Therefore, the reasoning individual cannot be conceived as ‘naturally’ oriented towards the unconstrained expression of potentialities. On the contrary, reason can lead the individual towards multiple forms of imprisonment.
On the other hand, if the individual is no longer deemed as possessing a redemptive, all-powerful capability to master the self and nature, her/his various acts and reactions can no longer be endowed with an aura of sacredness. Instead, the door is open to question the integrity of human mind and consciousness.
III – The administered society and the role of ideology
Marcuse identifies the ‘administered society’ with the emergence of a new kind of power in modern societies. Domination, based on physical coercion, is complemented by administration, based on mobilization, homogenization and assimilation.
Adorno and Horkheimer stressed the influence of technical, intellectual and cultural apparatuses that prescribe and impose socially desired patterns of behaviour and thought, so that human instincts, desires and thoughts are turned into channels that perpetuate the status quo[xv]. A cycle of mutual identification between the people and the dominant economic and social organisations is established – culture, business, techniques and human needs become mutually reinforcing.
Marcuse reached a similar conclusion: the increasing quantity of goods and services turns the administered life into a comfortable one. As needs are successfully created and satisfied, self-determination and freedom are progressively relegated to the backstage[xvi].
According to Althusser (1995), the ‘repressive state apparatus’ is complemented by ‘ideological state apparatuses’ (schools, churches, parties, trade unions, families, newspapers, cultural events), which constitute an ‘ideological superstructure’ of domination. Althusser defines ideology as the representation of ‘the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence’ (1995:307), relating it to manipulation or restriction of consciousness. Ideology constitutes (‘interpellates’) individuals as subjects, and ensures their mutual and self-recognition. The final objective is the subjection of the subject, as well as the reification of the existing order.
These views are not without its problems, and hence need to be qualified. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1980, 1986) have persuasively argued that, in modern societies, there is no such thing as a uniform consciousness imposed by a coherent dominant class. Instead of manipulatory indoctrination, they argue for another role and character of ideological domination: ideology functions by ‘dampening down oppositional activity’ (1980:157). The reification of prevalent arrangements renders ‘irrational’ any kind of alternative, and inhibits the development of counter-ideologies.
Edkins criticizes Althusser’s idea of misrecognition and false consciousness, by arguing that it implies the existence of a certain ‘truth’ or ‘real condition’:
‘[the ideological] is not the misrecognition of a positive essence, but exactly the opposite: it is the non-recognition of the precarious character of any positivity’ (1999:131).
Rather, Edkins argues for a concept of ideology connected with the Foucauldian notion of ‘regime of truth’ and Gramsci’s ‘hegemony’. Ideology, as a discursive formation, is always the particular manifestation of a balance of forces.
There is another important aspect of ideology. Abercrombie, Hill and Turner explained social cohesion with the economic and social control of the subordinate masses, what they termed (quoting Marx) the ‘dull compulsion of economic relations’ (1980:163) [xvii]. I wish to argue that, in consumerist societies, ideology can assume the form of numerous ‘inexorable commands of free-choice’ (Klinger 2004:131), so that social integration relies, paradoxically, on individual freedom as consumerism. I will get back to this in Section V.
These accounts of the role and character of ideology in the ‘administered society’ are important insights into this analysis of the individual. Ideology is connected with what I would term ‘impaired consciousness’: under the influence of an hegemonic depoliticising ideology, the individual is not able to fully realise her/his status, inasmuch as the existent appears as the only viable and rational choice.
IV – The alienated individual
Similarly to Marcuse and Althusser, Fromm identified ‘anonymous authority... disguised as common sense, science, psychic health, normality, public opinion’ (1942:144). For him, this shift in the nature of authority entailed two consequences in the relation towards it: the first one is what he termed the ‘sado-masochistic character’ (1942:141)[xviii]; the second one is ‘automaton conformity’ (1942:160): the individual adopts entirely the kind of personality offered by the cultural patterns[xix]. This conformity is based on ‘pseudo-feeling’, ‘pseudo-thinking’ and ‘pseudo-willing’ (1942:168-172): a great number of our decisions are not really our own but are suggested from the outside. The ‘pseudo-self’ is defined by Fromm as
‘an agent who actually represents the role a person is supposed to play, but who does so under the name of the self’ (1942:177).
The assumption of the ‘pseudo-self’ is problematic because it suggests that there is somewhere a natural, original self. I will qualify it by debating the concept of alienation.
Against the optimistic belief in progress, Rousseau argued that the civilized individual was not a true one: the ‘natural man’ was endowed with essential unity and integrity, and the alienated, ‘civilized man’ was a fraction, the product of a deprivation, of the fragmentation of the self between a ‘true I’ and a ‘functional and social I’ (Feuerlicht 1978: 22-24, 66).
Instead of this view, which espouses an obscure notion of ‘human nature’, I wish to argue for an understanding of alienation based on the thwarting of human potential. I am following Adorno’s critique of the concept of self-alienation: by denying the possibility of an original situation of ‘being-in-itself’[xx], Adorno argued against the idea of alienation from a particular human essence or nature.
Another important insight is Marx’s conception of alienation of labour[xxi]. Marx developed his critique of alienation by focusing on its material origins in private property and in the social division of labour. For Marx, work provides the opportunity for the development of human potential, insofar as it is a conscious, creative and social process. Work is both a ‘world-building’ and a ‘self-realising’ activity (Schroyer 1973:77); there is an inherent dialectics between the act of production and the worker getting to know her/his powers and limitations.
Under capitalism, though, labour is dehumanized and dehumanizing. The alienation of the worker from the products of own labour (which are taken away and sold), as well as from the processes of production, turns work into an ‘alien activity’ (Feuerlicht 1978:131). Consequently, the worker is alienated from society and from her/himself: alienated labour, by identifying the individual with a producer of commodities, separates the individual from her/his own active powers and limits the development of conscious activity aimed at transcending the prevailing arrangements.
Thus, in Marx, alienation is no longer conceived as the corruption of a natural, essentialized self, but rather a process by which the potential of the individual is reduced to the atomised capacity to sell labour in order to survive. Alienation is a disruption of the human capacity for self-production and self-realization.
However, Marx’s conception is not without its liabilities. As critics (like Habermas) have noted, the excessive focus on the level of the productive relations can be seen as a weakness, insofar as it prevents Marx (as well as his close followers) from identifying emancipatory prospects in other realms. Moreover, for Marx, alienation is not exactly a psychological problem of the individual, but rather a consequence of the social organization of work: the solution will not be achieved by emancipation at the individual level, but only by social emancipation from private property and from alienating work relations in the capitalist system (Gingrich 2002).
It seems that, for Marx, the only realm in which human potentialities can be questioned, debated or fulfilled is that of labour and productive relations. However, as Schroyer has noted (and as we have seen in the last section), the dialectics of capitalist accumulation and the impact of ideology increasingly alienate the individual from the chances of recognizing domination – human consciousness is impaired by ideological apparatuses and by the socializing forces of production.
Therefore, in Marx’s work, ‘there is no compelling reason for emancipatory struggle’ (Schroyer 1973:96). How is consciousness to be achieved, if the mental world of the worker is colonized by the urge to make a living? How is a disruptive move to be realised, if capitalist work and productive relations are the sole basis of human alienation? Clearly, these views need to be broadened in order to account for other realms of alienation, and, therefore, other sites of emancipatory potential.
Marx’s views seem to be a narrow application of Hegel’s conception of social-individual alienation. For Hegel[xxii], alienation is a break of the unity between the self and the social world or cosmos: it is characterized by the impossibility to recognize and comprehend reified structures. Liberation from these historical abstractions presupposes a two-fold process of self-consciousness and ‘mutual recognition’, whereby the individual assumes a role as part of a moral totality.
Thus, alienation cannot be conceived simply as the result of particular arrangements in the realm of labour and production. Rather, it must be addressed as a pervasive phenomenon that manifests itself in the destruction of the moral totality (with instrumental reason) and in broad social, economic and cultural arrangements that impose a world of reification within the individual.
Modern alienation is also connected with the encroachment, in personal and cultural life, of nihilism – a state of mind in which nothing appears to have value or meaning[xxiii]. Adorno identified nihilism with the triumph of instrumental reason and with the development of the exchange-system, through which the exchange-value of things serves as a mediator for domination, and the use-value is lost (Bernstein 1995:21-34, Rengger 2001).
The consequence is a generalized loss of meaning and a set of deformations of individual and community life: the disintegration of notions of worth and value; the dissolution of the bonds of sense between individual, community and culture; the estrangement from prospects of change. The instrumentalist kingdom of means paves the way for the nihilistic kingdom of end-indifference: ‘subjective reason conforms to anything’ (Horkheimer 1947:22).
Introducing nihilism in this analysis has one important theoretical consequence: emancipation is not merely a question of introducing social or economic changes in the realm of labour, but must also involve efforts aiming at personal and cultural change.
Hegel’s answer to alienation (as a break between self and cosmos) was an exploration of human capacities for transcendence.
Hegel drew from the transcendental character of alienation to identify possibilities for the liberation from abstractions[xxiv]. Through ‘alienation-as-transcendence’, the individual overcomes estrangement from the individual and social world, and comes to de-reify historical alienations, thereby assuming subjectivity – a role in the production of the world[xxv].
In Hegel, the transcending character of alienation is connected with the idea of ‘unhappy consciousness’: all consciousness is doomed to be unhappy because the spirit is constantly yearning to transcend his given state[xxvi]. This is not an assertion of the essentialized character of human nature, but rather the evidence of the limitless potential of the individual: the ‘unhappy consciousness’ is the denial of the given, the denial of an external determination of life, and the basis of a struggle for self-realization.
Alienation-as-transcendence, triggered by the ‘unhappy consciousness’, is the ‘leap’ into a new situation in which the individual-as-agent and the world are reconciled. Possibilities for liberation are not merely located in the realm of relations of production; instead, Hegel focuses on the potentialities that exist within the individual.
To sum up: my analysis of Fromm’s ‘pseudo-self’ led me to a discussion of the problem of alienation. I argued for a concept of alienation based, not on the corruption of a natural self, but on the thwarting of both human autonomy (through the prescription of behaviour) and human capacity for self-creation and transcendence (through reification).
V – Freedom and choice: problems
This analysis emphasises the interplay of three different levels of freedom[xxvii]. Personal freedom, or freedom from external constraints, consists in the opportunities and private space that the legal, economic and social institutions leave open or guarantee. Positive freedom (or ‘freedom to’) focuses on powers and capacities to develop free action, and includes a substantive and normative character: freedom is goal-oriented because it must be used to further new skills and develop human potential. Finally, internal freedom is connected with ‘free will’: freedom cannot exist without ‘conscious and self-directed knowledge’ (Lind 1985:117), and knowledge cannot exist without its practical consequence in self-realizing action.
Thus, free choice and action imply internal freedom on the part of the subject – a ‘restoration of individual thought’ (Marcuse 1964:4). As Fromm remarked: ‘the right to express our thoughts... means something only if we are able to have thoughts of our own’ (1942:207).
For Marcuse, the decline of freedom is not the result of intellectual corruption, but rather the logical consequence of the production and distribution of an increasing quantity of goods and services. In the affluent, administered society, the increase of what Horkheimer terms ‘assembly-line type options’ (1947:96) diverts the attentions away from the fundamental lack of freedom in setting the patterns of individual and social life. More than that, the granting of liberties (such as the liberty to choose between brands and gadgets) serves to strengthen the established mode of production and consumption.
Bauman (1988) goes much in the same way. For him, the idea of individual freedom is a discursive construction of a particular system of relations – the conditions of life in the capitalist society. Capitalist individual freedom has its apotheosis in consumerism; with it, social control is achieved, not through the suppression of individual freedom, but rather through its modulation and restriction to the realm of consumption. Consumerism becomes ‘the playground for individual freedom’ (Bauman 1988:61), a palliative for the loss of autonomy in the realm of production and, more generally, in the determination of life.
Therefore, as Bauman concludes, in the capitalist-consumerist society social integration no longer depends on the universal acceptance of a specific ideological formula, but rather on the encroachment of an apolitical, comfortable and passive situation of satisfaction of needs.
To conclude: the importance of internal and positive conceptions of freedom shows that the degree of human freedom does not rest on the range of choice, but rather on ‘what can be chosen and what is chosen by the individual’ (Marcuse 1964:7, emphasis in the original). As we will see in the next chapter, freedom must be connected with a specific content and purpose.
VI – Individual and ontological insecurity
The discussion carried out in this chapter has deep implications for the notions of individual, freedom and choice. Emancipation through unconstrained choice and based on the sovereign individual (as formulated by Booth), is clearly at stake.
Against the ontological certainty of the ‘sovereign individual’ thesis, Marcuse argued that we have no natural, privileged access to our own feelings. Knowledge depends on an awareness of the entire set of social-historical relationships in which feelings and individual qualities arise and function. In other words, it depends on self-consciousness and the ability to recognize the existent as contingent.
Fromm described the process of individuation as a dual phenomenon comprising, on the one hand, the growing importance of ideas of ‘individual personality’ and ‘self-strength’ and, on the other hand, a growing sense of ‘aloneness and insecurity’ (1942:23). With this chapter, I have tried to argue that emancipation must take into account this ontological insecurity within the individual. Emancipation will not be achieved merely by institutional-political arrangements or the acquisition of centres of power by critical social movements. Considering that the malaise is located at a deeper realm, emancipation must also aim at the conditions of individual freedom and choice. Again, Marcuse is eloquent:
‘The realization of a “better future” involves far more than the elimination of the bad features of the “market”, of the “ruthlessness” of competition, and so on; it involves a fundamental change in the instinctual as well as cultural structure.’ (1969:272, 273)
A Western individual?
One can question the supposed ‘ethnocentrism’ of the views presented here. Are they not inherently Western, insofar as they focus on the individual character under developed capitalist societies, as well as on the individualist doctrine that finds its roots in Christian culture?
Fanon’s work on the ‘colonized personality’ can be useful. In his work, colonialism means, not only the imposition of political and economic structures, but also the creation and maintenance of the ‘colonized man’ (2001:198). True liberation can only be achieved by the conquest of subjectivity, as well as by the construction of political consciousness at both individual and communal levels. Fanon also stresses the importance of the mobilization of a non-domesticated national culture, towards the fulfilment of the potential for national and individual independence.
Fanon’s chapter on ‘Colonial War and Mental Disorders’ (2001:200-250), as well as his connection between colonial rule and the prevalence of a technologized rationality (see 2001:253), strengthen the idea that the struggle against domination is played, not only against exogenous constraints, but also against internalized forms of colonial repression. Thus, if ‘individual existence... is a link in the chain of national existence’ (2001:161), colonial struggle requires a ‘new man’ (2001:246)[xxviii].
Chapter Three
Emancipation Of The Self
The objective of this chapter is to identify emancipatory capacity and possibilities. I will begin by addressing the grounding and character of the critique (I), and proceed with a reconsideration of the subject in terms of its emancipatory potential (II). This will lead me to a discussion about the importance of a conception of human essence (III) and, also, about the importance of intersubjective insights (IV). The last section will point out two ‘concrete utopias’ that must be central to the emancipation of the self (V).
I – The grounding and character of critique
In a critique of Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensionality, Offe argued that ‘critical theory must include an account of its own possibility’ (1988:221). The apparently fatalistic character of a social and mental universe completely invaded by instrumental reason seems to curtail any possibilities of critique. Isn’t the critique of rationality itself undermined by the existing structures and constraints on rationality[xxix]?
In order to answer to this, I will begin by analysing the character of the critique.
The critique of reason is inherently negative, and concerned with the maintenance and strengthening of negativity. Negation provides the ‘second dimension’, what Brecht would term the ‘estrangement effect’ (Lind 1985:286) from the existing arrangements. The objective is to shatter reification: by increasing the distance between the social reality and the standpoint of revolt, a space is created for critical judgment and opposition, which in turn constitutes the first step towards social transformation.
Therefore, the critique is grounded on the purposive and productive character of the refusal. Bernstein distinguished ‘abstract negativity’ (mere denial) from ‘determinate negation’, which is purposeful and is seen as a task or duty (1988:14). Negation, as the manifestation of a ‘rebellious subjectivity’, was considered by Marcuse as some sort of ‘higher law’ with ‘universal validity’ (Habermas 1988:11). The Archimedean point for the freedom of thought in the administered world rests on ‘the consciousness of its repressive productivity and [on] the absolute need for breaking out of this whole’ (Marcuse 1964:253, emphasis added).
For Marcuse, who saw the relegation of alternatives to the world of ‘utopianism’ as one of the most important aspects of reification, reawakening utopia was, more than a normative option, a political imperative. The refusal of the hegemonic reality and the transgression of the boundaries of social imagination were seen as duties[xxx].
According to Marcuse, utopia as social fantasy functions as a mental activity that retains a degree of autonomy from the reality principle, preserving ‘the tabooed images of freedom’ (1969:141) and protesting against
‘the unhappy consciousness of the divided world, the defeated possibilities, the hopes unfulfilled, and the promises betrayed’ (Marcuse 1964:61) [xxxi].
Fantasy is thus connected with remembrance. Remembrance is, in the first place, a duty towards the victims of oppression and suffering. One of the sources of discontent with social reality must be the fact that society still witnesses the most shameful forms of human misery. Critique as remembrance is an effort to redeem the past and the present. As Wyn Jones (1999) has noted, remembrance involves social and moral learning.
On the other hand, remembrance is connected with de-reification, with the revealing of the historical conditions that led us to be as we are. According to Adorno, ‘every reification is a forgetting’ (quoted in Jay 1988:33)[xxxii]. The critical function of memory prevents the status quo from establishing itself as eternal. Remembrance is not the recollection of an archaic knowledge or a particular ‘golden age’, but rather an exercise of suspicion.
Therefore, fantasy and remembrance are empowering and oriented towards emancipation: their repressive content reinforces the consciousness of self-mastery[xxxiii] and leads the individual to recognize the distance between reality and fantasy (what is desired, possible, immanent). The inadequacy of the given is thus revealed.
Moreover, by drawing attention to history as the expression of human action, and by preserving a consciousness of potentiality, these elements are inherently prospective[xxxiv].
Scott’s (1990) work on the ‘hidden transcripts’ shows us concrete examples of the (often disguised and unconscious) preservation of remembrance and fantasy as social spaces of dissent and resistance. Contradictions and tensions between the ‘public transcript’ (the open interaction between subordinates and those who dominate) and the ‘hidden transcript’ (the discourse that takes place ‘offstage’) are the basis for a theory of ‘double consciousness’ (1990:44): the perception and distaste of domination survive in elements of culture (folktales, oral culture, rituals of reversion such as carnival), constituting the base for an ‘infra-politics of the powerless’ (1990:xiii).
If emancipation is a moral project, critique must necessarily be a normative decision, a human fiat based on a stance that is not (and must not be) entirely ‘rational’, but eminently emotional. Critique is the first step towards transcendence and constitutes, in itself, a transcendental move away from the rationality of what is to be criticised. The grounding of critique is the acknowledgment that ‘things need not be this way’ and the belief that ‘things can be better than this’. Critique is the commitment and duty of a concerned, caring individual.
Also, critique must recognise the contingency of its status as reason and as critique. It must possess a ‘scrupulous attention to its own limitations’ and a ‘fundamental insecurity about its conditions of possibility’ (Hutchings 2001:84, 87). The self-critique of reason is the first step towards the full acknowledgement of one’s own position, and towards the reconciliation of reason with the individual[xxxv]. Ashley (1996) argued for a general ethos or art of life that would follow from the constant problematization of the self and the struggle to live a virtuous ideal. The abdication of reason as total knowledge and total control, as well as the recognition of the unfinished and precarious character of any assertions concerning ‘reality’, can well be the first step towards a reconstruction of the subject.
II – New groundings for the subject
This section will identify theoretical stepping-stones for the reconsideration of the subject in emancipatory terms.
In a critique of Marcuse’s deterministic emphasis on the influence of social structures, Schoolman (1980) attempted to develop a richer notion of subjectivity by reinterpreting Freud’s theories of socialisation and formation of the ego. According to Schoolman, the constitution of the ego is based on an antagonistic relation towards authority:
‘the ego cannot develop for an-other (the society) without simultaneously developing a self against the other’ (1980:234-5).
The ego is more resistant to ideological incorporation than what Marcuse’s work suggests: some cognitive faculties remain relatively independent and, therefore, potentially critical and resistant.
The existence of this ‘intact ego structure’ does not lead us to essentialism, but rather calls our attention to the mental apparatus as a selective entity, able to discriminate and make decisions, able to recognize ‘what can be’ and yearn for ‘what ought to be’, instead of merely bowing down to ‘what is’.
Consequently, even if constrained, the individual is more than the sum of social role, status or function. This kind of synergy, which Klinger describes as an ‘alterity’ towards the rules and mechanisms of society, allows for a distance from the current arrangements and enables the subject to exceed the system, grounding identity ‘in something other than itself’ (2004:125).
I will define the subject as an ‘open signifier’, a definition which focuses on the centrality of human potentiality[xxxvi]. Following Lacan and Althusser, Laclau envisioned the subject as carrying a ‘constitutive lack’: ‘there is no content which is a priori destined to fill it, and it is open to the most diverse articulations’ (1996:63). This incompleteness-openness, which means that the subject is not condemned to a particular state, becomes essential to the capacity and prospects of emancipation.
The subject is always a process: its only centre is not some sort of ‘being’ (as in the liberal individual), but rather a possibility of ‘becoming’. The radical undecidability of the subject needs to be constantly replaced and compensated by acts of decision. It is the failure of the structure to be a source of meaning and identity that compels the subject to act as ‘a will transcending the structure’ (Laclau 1996:92). The actions of the subjects emerge because of the very contingency of the discourses that confer identity to them.
If the adequate representation of the subject is impossible, its content is always the contingent manifestation of the prevalent balance of forces among social actors, the result of struggle and hegemonic relationships[xxxvii]. As Pieterse put it, emancipation and the power to which it is opposed are ‘discursive contestations in a field of forces’ (1992:24).
By focusing on the multiplicity of social relations from which antagonisms and struggles may originate, Laclau and Mouffe make the case for an ‘expansion of the field of social conflictuality’ (1995:347), as reified structures are progressively put into question by conscious individuals and social movements. Following Foucault, Pieterse (1992) has idealized transcendence in localized transgressions, leading to a gradual alteration of the dominant discourse.
The conception of the subject as an ‘empty signifier’ has important consequences for emancipatory politics. On the one hand, emancipation finds a new objective in the restoration of the conditions of potentiality – conscious choice and self-creation of the subject. On the other hand, emancipatory policies must be self-reflexive: the particular hegemony is always permeated by a constitutive ambiguity, and must therefore be in constant redefinition, safeguarding itself against totalitarian tendencies. Radical and plural democracy, as envisioned by Laclau and Mouffe (1995), ‘recognizes and incorporates a sense of its own contingency and precariousness’ (Howarth 2000:123).
III – Individual and essence
For Althusser, the absence of essences and the consequent ‘misrecognition’ of the subject in ideological structures was the only acceptable conception of essence:
‘the human subject is de-centred, constituted by a structure which has no ‘centre’ either, except in the imaginary misrecognition of the ‘ego’, i.e. in the ideological formations in which it ‘recognizes’ itself’ (1993:170-1, emphasis added).
I wish to go further than this, by identifying potentiality as the nucleus of human essence. The subject is not merely an ‘empty void’, condemned to permanent uncertainty; rather, it is an ‘open void’, capable of change and betterment. Potentiality represents the full spectre of human possibilities that result from the fundamental lack of determination.
According to Marx, the historical development of the forces of production created non-material ‘existential needs’, which were the manifestation of human experience (memory) and human possibilities in the attained degree of technological and industrial development. The recognition of the historicity of the subject and the structures would lead to an awareness of the extent to which the current arrangements frustrated the satisfaction of these ‘existential needs’, i.e. the increasing gap between the reality and the possibilities immanent in that reality[xxxviii]. This was the source for a constitutive understanding of the individual: the historical experience was taken up into the definition of a human essence, which included the sum of skills, needs and aspirations which progressively developed through history.
Therefore, ‘essence as potentiality’ is the transcendental insight over reification, the result of the recognition that the human being is the author of history and that history is the objective, material expression of human potentialities.
Potentiality assumes an universal character. Marcuse defined as ‘untranslatable universals’ (1964:209) the elements of thought that cannot be reduced to the self-referring one-dimensional world. These abstract universals, which were the result of the ‘unhappy consciousness’, could serve as normative ‘nodal points of thought’ (Marcuse 1964:209), conceptual instruments for understanding and judging particular conditions in the light of their potentialities:
‘the concept of beauty comprehends all the beauty not yet realized; the concept of freedom all the liberty not yet attained’ (Marcuse 1964:214).
Therefore, in order to preserve an historical perspective over reification, it is necessary to protect and strengthen universal guiding ideas, which espouse potentiality as a human essence. These ideas do not refer to any universal positive content, but rather to universal possibilities of particular, contextualized betterment.
However, the vagueness of the concept of potentiality leads us back to the problem identified in the beginning: how do we evaluate different hegemonic pretensions to fill the gap in the subject? Are all human potentials (such as aggressiveness) to be fomented? What stops us from falling again into the ‘marketplace of emancipation claims’?
In response to this, Fromm attempted to define ‘genuine ideals’:
‘we thus come to define a genuine ideal as any aim which furthers the growth, freedom and happiness of the self, and to define as fictitious ideals those compulsive and irrational aims which subjectively are attractive experiences (like the drive for submission), but which actually are harmful to life’ (1942:230-1).
The ‘genuine ideal’ is thus connected with the ‘affirmation of the self’ (as opposed to the sado-masochistic and conformist tendencies), with the ‘spontaneous activity of the total, integrated personality’ (1942:222). By ‘total personality’, Fromm means the creative activity resulting from the interplay of will and emotional, intellectual and sensuous experiences[xxxix]. By ‘integrated personality’ he means the self in unity with the world, the others and with itself.
Fromm’s ‘compulsive and irrational aims’ remind us that the satisfaction of certain individual needs can hinder the development of consciousness and human potential, and even endanger human survival. With the concept of ‘repressive needs’ (Marcuse 1964:246), the reproduction of the social exploitation within the individual (disguised in the various satisfying liberties of consumerism) becomes a condition for the maintenance of a system of repression and growing inequalities[xl]. For Marcuse, an emancipated society demanded a ‘revolution of needs’ aimed at eliminating the violence that the individual’s actions and choices cause, not only to the self, but also (and most significantly) to others.
Therefore, the new degree of consciousness has impact, not only on the level of the subject, but also on the level of intersubjective relations.
IV – Subject and subjects
For Touraine (1992), it was exactly the absence of consciousness that destroyed in the individual the capacity to be a social being: he identified the emergence of the conscious subject with an ethics of responsibility towards others. In the subject as ‘social movement’, the ‘militant commitment’ and the ‘caring commitment’ (Touraine 1992:268, my translation) run side by side.
According to Honneth, ‘critical social theory must focus on the distortion of the social relations of recognition’ (1994:264). An analysis of the subject must take into account the identity claims of actors and the correspondent moral expectations of recognition and respect. An analysis of the structures and social relations must focus on the forms of ‘social disrespect’ (Honneth 1994:262) they generate.
Wyn Jones (1999) has criticized Honneth’s work because of the underlying assumption that there is some kind of harmony between the identity claims of individual subjects. The way to counter possible problems arising from the clash of identities and interests is addressed in Linklater’s recent work on Norbert Elias’s ‘civilising process’ and the problem of harm (2002, unpublished paper). Linklater argues that the former is based on increased openness to dialogue and accountability to others; similarly, his ‘discourse perspective’ towards a universalist dialogic politics is concerned with
‘protect[ing] individuals from unwarranted interference in their personal and collective lives unless their actions clash with others’ rights to be free from harm to vital interests’ (Linklater, unpublished).
Even though the first part of this quote might point towards liberal views of the subject (an objection that Linklater tries to dispute), the second part shows the concrete intersubjective concerns of Linklater’s discourse ethics.
Extrapolating, we can conclude that the development of potentiality implies an intersubjective understanding of what it means to be another – the development of a subject-for-the-other. The total personality is integrated in a complex web of social interactions by: a) recognising identity claims and meeting up with moral expectations; b) avoiding harm (as well as the structures that perpetuate it); c) developing responsibility and solidarity with the victims of harm; and d) avoiding universalist stances that promote exclusion and hinder intersubjective understanding.
In sum: the development of human potential implies communication, care and active solidarity towards the potentialities of others. Subjects, as moral agents, are invited to surpass mere individuality and think from the standpoint of others.
V – Concrete utopias
As Wyn Jones has pointed out,
‘critical theorists must not lose sight of the fact that the coherence of their project is dependent on their utilization of the critical potential of immanence’ (1999:77).
Critical social theory must include an account of ‘concrete utopias’ (Wyn Jones, forthcoming), ‘small-step’ emancipatory projects with procedural (rather than end-point) ambitions. The objective of this section is to point out two concrete routes towards the emancipation of the self.
Critical pedagogy
Education, whose object is the production or training of the individual mind, is highly influent in the reproduction of social processes and understandings. Therefore, any transformation of the self must include a pedagogical dimension.
According to Freire, there is no such thing as a neutral educational process: if education is not a ‘practice of freedom’ (1972:13), it ends up being (intentionally or not) implicated in ‘social engineering’, i.e. in the integration of the individual into the logic of the system. Therefore, pedagogy must be a privileged site for struggle and emancipatory action. As Rosow has argued,
‘education has the power to lift individuals above their position, to break through stereotypes, and to give individuals some control of their fate against an unequal and unjust social order’ (2004:261).
Critical theory must include what Neufeld termed ‘engaged pedagogy’ (1995:117), conscious of its own role and limitations, aimed at criticizing the status quo in the interests of an alternative order. This ‘engaged pedagogy’ must invade the prevalent arrangements in the educational system, and specially work to disrupt established methods that have effects in the maintenance and reproduction of the current state of the individual.
In particular, critical pedagogy must struggle against the encroachment of what Newson (2004) termed the ‘student-as-consumer model’. Based on increasing interconnection between educational institutions and corporations, this model progressively establishes the conception of students as ‘costumers of an emerging technology-facilitated knowledge industry’ and as ‘autonomous choosers in the educational products market’ (Newson 2004:229). The result is the triumph of instrumental rationality in the educational system: the teaching-learning process is reduced to criteria of cost-efficiency, budgetary accountability and productivity; knowledge is seen as a commodity – it is commercialized, reproduced and transferred.
Students, as individual recipients and beneficiaries of a commercial contract (‘money for degree’), come to see the educational process as the transferral of information and employability skills. As Newson argued, they ‘do not perceive education as a cultural and social space distinct from the world of commerce’ (2004:229). Their consumerist orientations are not only unchallenged, but strengthened.
Students, as atomised consumers, are thus alienated from the social environment and the learning community. Their status as receivers of a service has deep effects in the consciousness of both their responsibility in the learning process and their political status. With the introduction of consumerism in education, the individual is disconnected from any political entitlement. The social reality is, thereby, further reified.
Against this culture of silence and passivity, Freire (1972, 1973) envisioned critical intervention through the means of ‘problem-posing education’. Problematization of the world, and the subsequent critical analysis of a problematic reality, is the opposite of the one-dimensional ‘problem-solving’ stance, which aims at achieving stability by providing learning experiences that ultimately serve to train minds in order to conform to and reproduce the established.
The objective of critical pedagogy, as an exercise of suspicion, is not to transfer subversive information, indoctrinate or make propaganda, but rather to raise in individuals the ability to question for themselves the situations in which they live, in order to recognize them as contingent.
The process of ‘conscientization’ (‘conscientização’, Freire 1973) is dual: on the one hand, it is important to raise an awareness of the extent to which human life is oppressed and human possibilities are frustrated. On the other hand, individuals must come to realise that ‘ordinary’ activities and experiences are important in the production and reproduction of the world as it is. This consciousness of agency opens a space for alternative strategies[xli]. At the root of critical pedagogy must be a faith in the individual as agent, as somebody who is able to look critically at the world and act upon it.
Critical pedagogy is connected with empowerment and action. The pedagogy of the consumerist chooser, narrowly conceived as the commercialization and transference of ‘skills and information packages’, is replaced by the all-embracing and liberating ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ (Freire 1972). As Fanon has noted, political action is pedagogical action in the process of development of consciousness:
‘If the building of a bridge does not enrich the awareness of those who work on it, then that bridge ought not to be built and the citizens can go on swimming across the river or going by boat’ (2001:162).
Following a Marxian theme, Freire considers that this ‘conscious action to transform the world’ (1973:87) is, in itself, a process of humanisation of the individual, for it allows for the development of the full range of capacities and potentialities.
Moreover, critical pedagogy must be eminently dialogical. Not only the hierarchic dichotomy student-teacher is to be put into question, but a new kind of authority is to be adopted. Leadership and authority in critical pedagogical praxis are not connected with an enlightened revolutionary vanguard of ‘philosopher kings’, but rather with what Fromm termed ‘rational authority’, which aims at the growth and expansion of the individual. In critical pedagogy, the student-teacher relation is based on mutual trust and humility, so that hierarchic dichotomies are disrupted in a dialogical relationship of fellow learners. Thus, authority tends to dissolve itself:
‘[authority] will tend to decrease in direct proportion to the degree in which the person subjected to the authority becomes stronger and thereby more similar to the authority’ (Fromm 1942:143).
Another important dialogical function of critical pedagogy is the way it can contribute to challenge the ethnocentrism that pervades most of the established educational systems – what Hovey has termed ‘the obsession with the self’ (2004:246). By providing a ‘dialogue with the subaltern’ (Hovey 2004) and allowing for the expression of ‘subjugated knowledges’ (Rosow 2004:259), critical pedagogy can help to decentre reified self-understandings and hegemonic practices, and develop notions of resistance and alternative.
Politics (and policies) of hope
Emancipating the self will not be possible without policies that aim at rebuilding hope at both individual and communal levels. As we have seen, critique and resistance, based on a philosophical position towards human status and potentialities, are connected with a human fiat that needs emotional support: the rejection and transformation of the status quo require, not only consciousness, but also the attainment of a sufficient level of self-confidence. Hope can provide the forward-looking emotional resource necessary to trigger planning and purposeful action.
John Braithwaite (2004) directly interlocks hope and emancipation: there is a recursive process of hope fuelling emancipation and emancipation fuelling hope. According to him, structural reforms that bring emancipation lead nowhere without a politics of hope.
I would argue that emancipatory arrangements without policies of hope cannot be considered as meaningful. Taking into account the current state of the individual, one of the key elements in emancipatory politics must be the cultivation of strengths and possibilities of individuals and collectivities.
Valerie Braithwaite connects hope with empowerment and action by defining ‘institutions of hope’ as
‘sets of rules, norms and practices that ensure that we have some room not only to dream the extraordinary but also to do the extraordinary’ (2004:9).
One of the most important features of a ‘hope design principle’ is to realign hopes and preserve empowerment and action when things go wrong. Therefore, hope as an emotional experience must be tempered by ‘ideas, deliberation, experimentation and cold analysis’ (V. Braithwaite 2004:11).
Thus, the solution is not simply to preach hope as a kind of wishful thinking, but rather to conceptualize and develop practices that are able to avoid the numerous pitfalls of a discourse of hope[xlii], as well as the sense of frustration and powerlessness that arises when expectations are not met. A social vision embedded in a general discourse of hope must be complemented by a ‘micro-politics of hope’, based on concrete practices in concrete situations.
McGeer (2004) argues that hope must be a social phenomenon that engages with agential limitations, tests boundaries and finds ways of compensating in situations of failure. In developing the concept of ‘peer scaffolding’, she attempts to break with an individualistic concept of hope, putting forward the idea of ‘communities of mutually responsive hope’.
Meaningful collective hope can only develop out of individual hope, and the latter must be supported and harnessed through interaction and dialogue with hopes of others. Thus, emancipation of the self welcomes community-level initiatives aimed at developing hope and self-confidence, at both individual and group levels. Because agency grows out of mutual trust and support, hope in practice involves the development of social bonds of solidarity.
Conclusion
Towards ‘Emancipation Of The Self’
Remaining faithful to the original antagonism between the terms ‘security’ and ‘emancipation’, this paper’s first goal was to problematize the ahistorical assumptions and the pre-given answers, concerning the individual, that permeate the CSS literature.
Against the liberal view that emerged from these unexamined positions, I argued for the prevalence, in modern societies, of an ontological insecurity within the individual. I attempted to avoid any deterministic and essentialist assumptions by also taking into account the ontological insecurity of the individual. Because the lack of determination means a fundamental openness towards multiple alternatives, I defined the individual as an ‘open signifier’, a term that does not foreclose the subject in a state of permanent uncertainty, but rather opens up the way for a new ontological security based on the possibilities of becoming.
It must be recognized that potentiality is central in Booth’s work. He believes in the power of an ‘immanent critique’, in the emancipatory possibilities already existent in a particular situation. Emancipation is a ‘condition of becoming, not a state of being’; it is the ‘theory and practice of inventing humanity’ (1999:41, 46)[xliii].
However, as we have seen, Booth envisions emancipation as the levelling of the economic and political ground from which human possibilities spring. Emancipation from external constraints is the attaining of conditions for a subsequent self-creation of the individual; it is ‘the vital precursor to the fuller development of human potential’ (Wyn Jones 1999:126, emphasis added).
This view actually leaves the individual alone and unprotected: by remaining at the level of ‘terracing’, it leaves unaddressed a great number of problems that are to be found in the ‘underground’. I have argued that certain internal conditions can be considered as ‘human wrongs’, obstacles to the full development of human capacities, so that the individual itself can be considered a threat to ‘security as emancipation’.
This attention towards internal constraints should not be considered paternalism, but rather a way to deal with the numerous dead-ends faced by an idea of emancipation indexed to a liberal conception of the individual: a) the clash and contradiction of different emancipatory stances; b) the fact that, in some situations, the ‘emancipation’ of a group involves the oppression of another; c) the fact that, in the discursive field of forces, ‘emancipation’ for some might mean ‘oppression’ for others.
Taking into account Pieterse’s remark that ‘emancipation implies empowerment, but not every form of empowerment is emancipatory’ (1992:9), and as a way to escape from this ‘marketplace of emancipation claims’ (in which the strongest and best equipped always end up prevailing), I argued for a conception of the individual as an analytical lens to evaluate and legitimate different emancipation claims. Therefore, following Fromm, I came to define emancipation of the self as the process of conscious self-creation and development of the total, integrated individual. This process must focus on both internal and external conditions for the interplay of intellectual, emotional and sensuous experiences, so that the individual is fully integrated in a web of solidaristic relationships.
Thus, emancipation of the self does not fall into the trap of a totalizing idea of the self: it is not a return to liberal individualism, but rather the construction of strong moral footholds for the development of both individual and society.
In other words, emancipation has an intersubjective content and purpose: the product of emancipation is not an all-powerful, self-sufficient subject, able to undertake rational calculations towards happiness and the fulfilment of unlimited potentialities. Rather, assuming selfhood through emancipation involves self-critique, a consciousness of limitations and, most importantly, the assumption of a historical and moral baggage.
In that sense, I identified human potentiality as the only acceptable conception of human essence, the result of social and moral learning. Potentiality involves the set of skills, needs and aspirations that have developed through history and which allow the subject to put its existence into perspective and visualize (imagine) ‘that which can be’ and ‘that which ought to be’.
The self must always safeguard its negativity, the standpoint for potentiality. Thus, the relation between the actual and the potential can never be solved. Potentiality must always remain an unfinished process, and the construction of the subject must always assume a problematic character. Violence is not just ‘that which increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance’ (Galtung 1969:168), but also that which, by reification, equates the potential with the actual, the possible with the existent. The emancipation of the self is, in fact, the unfinished (and unfinishable) emancipation of the potential of the self.
The absence of a positive essence has two consequences: firstly, opposition and emancipatory struggle are not natural and inevitable, and critique must always depart from a human fiat that simultaneously shatters reification and envisions alternatives. Secondly, as a result, the emergence of a certain reality, or positivity, as natural and inevitable is not the result of its own characteristics, but rather the consequence of the failure of the negative to act.
Thus, to every action there must be a resistance: negative struggles must operate in every realm in which there is the threat that a certain reality might establish itself and foreclose change and alternatives. The two concrete utopias suggested stress the urgent necessity of addressing the individual in emancipatory terms. Even though the ultimate concern of the ‘security as emancipation’ discourse is the individual, its political framework is still based on a critique of the state, complemented by a defence of alternative political arrangements that are to replace the state. There is no ‘politics of the individual’, i.e. no politics directly addressed at the internal problems faced by the individual, but only at the surrounding structures and external constraints.
With this paper, I have tried to draw attention to the individual as a threat, a field of struggle and a site for emancipation. The expansion of the struggle to the inner depths of the individual will entail a new understanding of ‘security as emancipation’. The latter must be, on the one hand, broader, for it aims at the identification of new threats and the ‘securitization’ of realms previously left unaddressed[xliv]. On the other hand, it must be deeper, for it identifies a new referent object, not in the individual as essentialized recipient of ‘wrongs’, but rather in the individual capacities for self-creation and choice. Emancipation must aim to protect, not only the individual body from external aggressions (such as war, torture, famine, disease), but also the individual mind and individual potentiality from violent interferences and internalized forms of repression.
The objective is not a state of absence of threats, because threats will always develop out of human interaction. Rather, security is to be conceptualized in terms of the development, at both individual and community levels, of internal capacities and material conditions for an effective and conscious response to challenges. A process of constant problematization opens the way for a ‘dynamic state’ of consciousness, self-creation and humility – a life less complacent and more concerned.
[i] In the strict sense of the term, emancipatio is the releasing of a son from the patria potestas. In general terms, emancipatio came to mean the formal surrender of anything, the delivery of authority or tutelage over a thing (Lewis and Short 1975).
[ii] It is not surprising that Securitas was personified as the tutelary goddess of the Roman State.
[iii] This formulation appears unchanged throughout Booth’s work – see 1991b:539, 1997:110 and 1999:40. In a more recent elaboration, emancipation is ‘the progressive freeing of individuals and groups from structural and contingent human wrongs’ (‘Critical Explorations’, forthcoming).
[iv] See Smith (forthcoming) for a good survey of the ‘broadening’ and ‘deepening’ debates in Security Studies, which deal, respectively, with the width of the conceptualization of threat and with the referent object of security.
[v] Booth wishes to keep in mind ‘all the failed projects and false universalisms of the past’ (1998b:347).
[vi] For an analysis of the rise of individualist doctrines, and their relation with capitalism, see Abercrombie, Hill and Turner (1986).
[vii] Booth’s description of these post-Westphalian arrangements focuses on the disintegration of sovereignty. He has talked about an ‘anarchical global “community of communities”’, based on multiple centres of allegiance (1991b:540). More recently, he has advocated a ‘cosmopolitan democracy in a world of post-sovereign states’ (1999:65). Booth’s views are inspired by David Held’s work in cosmopolitan democracy and Andrew Linklater’s restructuring of the political community. See Linklater (1990, 1997) and Held (2002); for a critique of Held, see Axtmann (2002).
[viii] See Booth (1999:41).
[ix] Snyder and Ballentine have made a similar point in their supply/demand analysis of nationalist discourses in Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (1996).
[x] In an insightful analysis of instrumentalization of emancipation, Kennedy-Pipe describes the way in which discourses of emancipation of women were put forward by the Soviet authorities, as a way to both mitigate the influence of Islam in Central Asia and exploit women as labour resource (2004).
[xi] Booth bases his human rights culture in an ‘ethical community of victims’ (1999:37).
[xii] This is the interpretation of Marx’s polemic assertion: ‘The social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism’ (1992 [1844]:241, emphasis in the original).
[xiii] Fromm stresses the importance of the economic system, and its influence in the ‘mode of life’, in determining the character structure.
[xiv] As Feenberg (1988) has noted, the neutrality of formal thinking is both value-free (because it does not prescribe ends) and value-laden, insofar as it suppresses the dialectical concept of potentiality.
[xv] See their essay ‘The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception’ (1973:121-167). Touraine (1992) uses the phrase ‘programmed society’ to describe the situation in which mass production and diffusion of cultural goods serves the purpose of management of values.
[xvi] Marcuse puts it bluntly in the first sentence of his One Dimensional Man: ‘A comfortable, smooth, reasonable, democratic unfreedom prevails in advanced industrial civilization, a token of technical progress’ (1964:1).
[xvii] Similarly, Scott (1990) presents a ‘thin version’ of the theory of false consciousness, according to which social cohesion is based on resignation rather than consent.
[xviii] Analysis of this trait is beyond the scope of this argument. The sado-masochistic character, based on an inner ‘destructiveness’ connected with the ‘thwarting of life’ (Fromm 1942:156), is another name for the ‘authoritarian character’, a popular theme among Frankfurt School theorists. See Adorno (1951), Adorno and Horkheimer (1973:169-208), as well as Marcuse (1969) for similar analyses of the instinctual conditions for the rise of Fascist and Nazi ideologies.
[xix] Fromm’s ‘automaton conformity’ is similar to Horkheimer’s ‘submissive type’ (1947:141), the individual who has given up the hope of ultimate self-realization, surviving through mimicry, i.e. by conforming to and emulating the traits and attitudes of powerful groups and organisations.
[xx] Quoted in Feuerlicht (1978:51).
[xxi] This analysis of Marx’s views on alienation is based on Schroyer (1973:75-100), Feuerlicht (1978:130-139), Lind (1985:120-124) and Gingrich (2002).
[xxii] This analysis of Hegel is based on Schroyer (1973:54-73).
[xxiii] As Goudsblom (1980) has noted, nihilism is not merely a personal malaise, but an element of culture, the result of cultural patterns that shape individual action and experience.
[xxiv] Schroyer (1973) shows that, if alienation can be a negative act of estrangement (melancholia, loss of sanity, loss of concentration or independence), it can also be a positive act of transcendence (elevation from the senses, ecstasy, furor divinus).
[xxv] Marx’s labour-centred alienation can be conceived as one manifestation of the malaise in the ‘alienating power’ of self-consciousness.
[xxvi] Hegel’s ‘unhappy consciousness’ has its origins in an analysis of Christian faith. Hegel noted that Christianism is based on self-nullification and a sense of nothingness towards God. The individual’s yearning for identification with God can never be achieved, and so the individual is always unreconciled with her/himself.
[xxvii] I am following Lind’s analysis of the Marxist views of freedom (1985:113-119).
[xxviii] I have not yet found a completely satisfactory answer to the question of the supposed ethnocentrism of these views of the subject. This is certainly one topic that deserves further research.
[xxix] Wyn Jones (1999:42) has the same doubts.
[xxx] Booth’s procedural ‘utopian realism’ (1991b) is based on a similar ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ logic: the way we think in the present may open or close possibilities for the future; therefore, the maintenance and strengthening of utopia is a moral and intellectual duty.
[xxxi] It is not surprising that Fanon (2001) draws attention to the role of imagination and creativity in the songs and epic stories of a colonized country.
[xxxii] Fanon (2001) argues that one of the functions of colonialism is exactly the distortion of memory; this is patent, for example, in the domestication and folklorization of the national culture.
[xxxiii] Apter talks about a ‘repossession of the self’ (1992:144).
[xxxiv] ‘The subject is always freedom and history, project and memory’ (Touraine 1992:351, my translation).
[xxxv] According to Horkheimer, ‘what is lacking are men who understand that they themselves are the subjects and functionaries of their own oppression’ (1947:162). Fanon (2001) stressed the importance of communal self-criticism in the villages of Northern Africa, as a way to attain self-consciousness.
[xxxvi] I am following Laclau’s work on the ‘empty signifier’ (1996:36), a signifier without a signified – a term which derives from Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralist linguistics.
[xxxvii] Critical Theory has heavily relied on the work of Gramsci, and emphasised the role of critical social movements in developing ‘counter-hegemonic blocs’. Booth’s work is a good example; others are Wyn Jones (1999) and Feenberg (1999).
[xxxviii] This theme was later picked up by the Frankfurt School. See Schoolman (1980) and Lind (1985) for an analysis of Marx’s concept of essence in relation to the work of Marcuse.
[xxxix] Fromm envisioned a broad, ‘life-affirming’ concept of freedom: ‘freedom to create and to construct, to wonder and to venture... It is not enough that men are not slaves’ (quoted in Freire 1972:43).
[xl] For a good analysis of Marcuse’s concept of ‘repressive needs’, see Lichtmann (1988).
[xli] Freire quotes Lukács in describing the way this process works by ‘consciously activating the subsequent development of experience’ (1972:3).
[xlii] Drahos (2004) shows how hope can be discursively instrumentalized by elites and institutions, as a sedative to injustices and as a way of delaying and even avoiding initiatives for social change.
[xliii] Booth is emphatic in the description of security as a process, and of emancipation as a dynamic concept: ‘as circumstances change, so will the goals of emancipation’ (1997:110). His ‘process utopian’ stance, based on reformist steps instead of ideal structures to be achieved, as well as his notion of utopianism as an ‘attitude of mind’ (1991b:533), are consistent with the belief that ‘security in world politics can have no final meaning’ (‘Introduction’, forthcoming).
[xliv] Against the views of Wæver and the Copenhagen School, this ‘securitizing’ move (that is, the speech-act by which something is considered to be a threat to security) does not mean that the matter is taken away from public scrutiny, but exactly the opposite: the objective of ‘securitization’ is to raise an awareness that will lead to ‘desecuritization’ as the normal functioning of democratic and accountable practices. Krause and Williams (discussed in Smith, forthcoming) have a similar position towards ‘securitization’. For more on the ‘securitization’ approach, see Wæver (1995, 2000) and Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998).
